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Securitization of Small Business Loans
Christopher P. Beshouri 
Peter J. Nigro
This paper assesses the potential impact of securitization in improving small 
businesses’ access to credit. It begins by examining the nature of small business 
lending and the factors that make banks the primary providers of credit to small 
businesses. The paper then examines the conditions under which the benefits 
of securitization are fully realized and whether the nature of small business lend­
ing satisfies those conditions. We ar^ e that certain characteristics of small firm 
finance, especially information problems and the need for ongoing monitoring, 
are likely to mitigate the full benefits of securitization, that is, the substantial 
funding cost advantages. Specifically, loan buyers will demand substantial levels 
of loss protection to compensate for their uncertainty over the returns on the 
underlying credits and to leave intact the seller’s incentive to monitor properly 
the loans sold. Loss protection, however, will reduce or eliminate any funding 
cost advantages, including capital cost reductions. In the absence of lower fund­
ing costs, banks are unlikely to undertake substantial new lending to small busi­
nesses. Securitizations of small business loans could still take place, but they are 
likely to be undertaken for special purposes rather than as a primary funding 
mechanism.
I. Introduction
The critical role of small firms in the U.S. economy, particularly as the pri­
mary creators of jobs, is often used as justification for government interven­
tion in the small business sector. This intervention has appeared in 
numerous forms: tax incentives, streamlined regulatory and supervisory 
procedures, and loan guarantees. Recent research has examined the role of 
small firms in the U.S. economy in an effort to bring about more effective 
government intervention and to clarify the basis for those interventions. For 
example, while SBA reports show that small firms, especially those with 
fewer than 20 employees, were responsible for all net job growth between 
1988 and 1990, other studies, such as Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1994)
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have shown that there is no clear relationship between net job growth and 
employer size over longer periods of time. Their study also argues that 
many of the new jobs created by small firms are in the service sector, where 
job quality and wages tend to be lower. Such studies do not invalidate the 
policy focus on small firms, but they do indicate that a clearer and more 
sophisticated understanding of small business economics is needed to make 
informed policy choices.
Small firms’ access to credit has been central to the public policy debate. 
Recently, policymakers have been considering measures to increase the flow 
of credit to small firms, in particular the development of a secondary mar­
ket for small business loans. Most legislative initiatives insinuate that small 
business loan securitization will enhance the marketability of small business 
loans, permitting banks to make more small business loans and quickly sell 
them off to other investors. Using mortgage loans as a guide, they a i^ e  
that the development of a secondary market would permit specialization in 
origination, servicing, and funding of small business loans by the most effi­
cient financial intermediary. Furthermore, the act of pooling and offering 
loans for sale in a secondary market would help take small business funding 
from the narrower bank market to the broader and deeper capital markets. 
The combination of nonbank participants in credit delivery and the use of 
securitization of loans to tap the capital markets would, the reasoning goes, 
lead to more credit or cheaper credit or both for small businesses.
However, we argue that the nature and magnitude of the benefits of 
securitization will vary according to the type of asset being securitized. 
Securitization is likely to deliver substantial benefits when the underlying 
credits are relatively easy to assess and require little post-funding monitor­
ing. When information and monitoring problems are substantial, however, 
the benefits of securitization are likely to be minimal. In assessing securiti­
zation as a solution to the credit problems facing small firms, it is important 
to understand the specific nature and attributes of small business lending.^ 
In particular, there are two prominent characteristics associated with small 
firms: the shortage of reliable information about their risks and returns 
and the importance of ongoing monitoring in delivering expected loan 
returns. These obstacles have not been present or have been small in mag­
nitude for assets that have been successfully securitized.
Because of the shortage of reliable information and the need for ongo­
ing monitoring, purchasers of small business loans will demand that the 
seller provide relatively high levels of loss protection. Investors will seek 
high levels of loss protection to compensate for their inability to estimate 
with confidence the risks and returns of the underlying assets and to keep 
intact the seller’s incentive to monitor properly the loans sold. The eco-
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nomic effect of providing loss protection is that the selling bank essentially 
is unable to shed fully the risk of the loans it has sold, thereby mitigating 
some of the benefits of the loan sale. As the level of loss protection provided 
by the seller rises, the benefits to the seller from the loan sale fall. The need 
for the provision of loss protection also limits the entry of nonbank origina­
tors into the small business lending market.
This does not mean that securitizations of unguaranteed small business 
loans will not take place. They already have taken place, and will continue 
to take place. But we argue that they will be few in number, will involve the 
top-end of the small business loan market, and will carry substantial levels 
of loss protection. The few small business loan securitizations to date have 
in fact carried substantial levels of loss protection.
These conclusions about the limited benefits of securitization in this 
area assume that in general banks have made and are holding as many 
small business loans as they desire; that is, banks do not face a funding con­
straint. However, if funding is a problem, and if securitization can lower 
funding costs, then securitization—even when the selling bank provides 
substantial loss protection—^becomes more beneficial. Specifically, there 
may be banks that want to make and hold additional loans but foi^o these 
(profitable) lending opportunities because they find deposit generation too 
expensive. Such banks would presumably be willing to hold the first-loss 
position on loans they sell, if by so doing they can generate affordable fund­
ing through the capital markets for unexploited small business lending 
opportunities. Under these circumstances—where funding is a problem 
and banks would be willing to take on additional risk-securitization holds 
out more promise. Note however, the nature of such transactions: the sell­
ing bank retains a substantial portion of the underlying credit risk on the 
loans it sells, and the transaction does not generate capital cost savings. The 
fimding benefits are relative to deposit generation. Unless funding prob­
lems are widespread, the retention of credit risk—and the associated dimi­
nution of capital cost savings—will prevent securitization fi-om having the 
impact in small business lending that it has had elsewhere.
Public and private initiatives to promote a secondary market for small 
business loans specifically, and a higher level of lending to small firms gen­
erally, must take these characteristics of small business lending into 
account, both in the design of the initiatives and in the assessment of the 
potential impact of those initiatives. Of course, if a securitization program 
is preceded by or developed simultaneously with some type of federal or 
state loan guarantee or credit enhancement program, then the amount of 
credit available to smaller firms would likely increase. It is critical to
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emphasize, however, that the increase in small business lending would fol­
low largely from the guarantee, not the presence of a secondary market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the 
nature of small business finance and small businesses’ primary sources of 
credit and other financial services. Section III summarizes the relationship 
between sources of funding and the severity of information and monitoring 
problems by analyzing a firm’s ability to tap different types of debt markets. 
Section IV analyzes the types and potential benefits of securitization. Sec­
tion V provides support for our hypothesis by examining the characteristics 
and benefits of small business securitizations that have been completed. 
Section VI provides conclusions.
II. THE NATURE OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING
Information problems and the need for ongoing monitoring by the lender/ 
investor are at the root of the credit availability problems of small firms. 
The lack of information and the heterogeneity of small firms makes their 
success difficult to predict. Small business borrowers are also likely to 
require direct, intensive monitoring by their lenders because of scarcity of 
collateral, absence of reputation, and the nature of the credit purpose. This 
section evaluates the characteristics of small firm finance and the impact 
that information problems and monitoring can have on a firm’s access to 
credit.
A. Information Problems and Small Business Borrowers
The most common explanation given for small firms’ credit availability 
problems is the scarcity of information available to investors about project 
quality, financial soundness, or probable losses. Many small firms also lack 
marketable collateral or have marginal net worth. Start-up firms experi­
ence the most trouble, since they often have little beyond a business plan to 
show to a prospective lender, and many creditors typically require three 
years of financial statements from credit applicants. General information 
about small firms, or the industry in which the firm operates may help, but 
aggregated data is not a dependable indicator of the credit quality of other 
small business borrowers, because the prospects of small firms can vary dra­
matically, even within the same business line. The heterogeneity^ of these 
borrowers also makes it difficult to develop uniform underwriting stan­
dards. Lacking uniform underwriting standards, lenders are limited in 
their ability to use less expensive, automated credit-scoring methods for 
loan processing.
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The alternative for lenders is to expend additional resources to discover 
the true creditworthiness of a small business borrower. For example, loan 
officers at South Shore Bank in Chicago, an institution specializing in loans 
to information-problematic borrowers like small businesses, routinely drive 
through their neighborhoods, examining neighboring properties and 
developing links to community and business groups. These efforts provide 
additional market-specific and borrower-specific information that might 
not be available through the standard loan application process. Lenders 
can also provide complementary services that might raise the likelihood 
that the lender is repaid, such as technical assistance programs, basic busi­
ness guidance, or financial counseling. But while these services may 
enhance the lender’s ability to evaluate creditworthiness or increase the 
probability of repayment, they raise the lender’s costs and thus make the 
loan less profitable.
Operating expenses would be an important issue for lenders even if 
small business borrowers were not information-problematic. Smaller loans 
provide a smaller base over which to spread the fixed costs of lending, 
regardless of infonnation availability. One estimate puts a typical bank’s 
per-loan-dollar operating expenses for small business loans at 300 basis 
points, roughly four times the per-loan-dollar expense of middle-market 
loans and about 15 times higher than the per-loan-dollar expense of loans 
in the large, corporate market.^
B. Agency Problems and the Need for Monitoring
Small business lending costs are also higher because lenders typically 
must direcdy monitor borrowers on an ongoing basis. The need for moni­
toring arises out of the familiar agency problem or problem of moral hazard in 
lending: Once borrowers secure fimds, they may take actions that do not 
maximize the probability of loan repayment. Consequently, lenders moni­
tor borrowers direcdy or indirecdy in an effort to control the agency prob­
lem, that is, to influence the borrower’s attitude toward risk. Monitoring, 
which is distinct from servicing, involves paying close attention to firm-spe­
cific attributes such as investment policy, use of other credit, management 
changes, personnel changes, strategic plans, and project choices (see, e.g., 
Mester, 1992). The borrower’s behavior in these areas can affect the vari­
ability of the firm’s cash flow, which is the primary source of loan repay­
ment. M onitoring is undertaken to restore or m aintain compatibility 
between the actions of the borrower and the interests of the lender, and 
thereby minimize cash flow variability.
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Lenders could, of course, choose to ignore the agency problem and not 
monitor But if there is a relationship between monitoring and borrower 
behavior, and a subsequent relationship between borrower behavior and 
firm profitability, then there is a clear relationship between monitoring and 
loan returns. Therefore, neglecting monitoring when it is required implies 
that the volatility of loan returns will rise while the level of returns falls (see, 
e.g., Pennachi, 1988).
Generally, lenders will prefer indirect mechanisms to monitor borrower 
behavior, since such mechanisms typically entail lower costs than direct, 
ongoing monitoring. A common indirect monitoring mechanism is the 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Maintaining an LTV ratio less than one is meant 
to put a sufficient level of borrower wealth at risk such that the borrower’s 
incentives approximate those of the lender. One other indirect monitoring 
mechanism worth noting is reputation, which can ease the need for direct 
monitoring by acting as a form of collateral. Rrms with reputation have less 
incentive to take excessive risks because their behavior toward a single 
lender can impact their relationship with other creditors and suppliers. 
The cost of directly monitoring firms will also fall if the firm has multiple 
creditors or if the firm’s debt or equity trades publicly. In these cases, a 
number of different agents, such as rating agencies and stock analysts, typ­
ically cross-monitor the firm, which lowers the monitoring costs absorbed 
by any single agent (see Booth, 1992).
Covenants are an effort to mitigate the agency problem “contractually” 
by bonding the borrowers to observable and verifiable performance and 
operating criteria. A common covenant is a maximum debt-service-to- 
income ratio, which is meant to keep the firm’s accumulation of additional 
debt at a level the lender considers manageable. Other common covenants 
may bond borrower behavior toward the maintenance and liquidation of 
assets-in-place. It is important to note, however, that covenants are not via­
ble in cases such as general purpose or working capital loans. Because of 
the indeterminate nature of the credit need, the lender would be left to 
bond borrower behavior toward investment policy, strategic plans, project 
choice, or managerial compensation (see Booth, 1992). Behavior in these 
areas has a distinct impact on the likelihood of repayment, but the bor­
rower’s actions are not clearly observable and verifiable ex ante, or even 
contemporaneously. Such actions might be inferred from ex post out­
comes, if there is sufficient information regarding expected returns to a 
borrower or a borrower’s line of business. However, the creditor cannot 
influence the firm’s decisions after the fact. Consequently, covenants are 
limited in their usefulness, and probably least effective when tJie loan pro­
ceeds are for an indeterminate purpose.
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Although agency problems and the associated need for monitoring are 
common concerns in finance, they are especially prominent in small firm 
finance. Small firms, especially start-ups, lack many of the characteristics 
that naturally help alleviate the agency problem in business lending. Their 
net worth is thin, limiting the loss protection that their own equity can pro­
vide and thus the amount of credit they can secure. If small firms have col­
lateral, often it is not easily marketable or firm-specific. Consequently, 
repayment of loans to small firms rests primarily on expected future cash 
flow, which is directiy influenced by the borrower’s actions.
Furthermore, small firms also rely more heavily on general purpose 
credit, such as lines Of credit, than on borrowings for assets-in-place, both 
in terms of volume and number of transactions (see Table 1).  ^ Because gen­
eral purpose credit cannot be tied directly to a set of assets, monitoring 
these types of loans is not easily achieved through covenants or other con­
tractual features. Equally important, small firms also often lack reputation, 
which indicates that there is limited public information available about 
them. The lack of information suggests that there will be a shortage of third 
party monitors, and the full monitoring costs will fall on a single agent. 
This often leads to the establishment of a relationship with a specific lender, 
which can substitute for reputation. However, such a relationship is built 
over time and is not easily transferable.
Taken together, the characteristics of small firm borrowers and the pur­
poses for which they need credit limit the usefulness of indirect monitoring 
mechanisms. Consequently, lenders must resort to more expensive direct 
monitoring of small business borrowers. Because this form of monitoring 
is more costly, the profitability and thus attractiveness of small business 
lending falls.
C. The Role o f Banks in Small Firm Finance
The information co^ts associated with borrower screening have long 
been viewed as a rationale for the existence of financial intermediaries. 
Because the price mechanism does not provide a perfect screening device, 
lenders will instead base credit decisions on imperfect, nonprice mecha­
nisms, such as referrals, relationships, or exacting underwriting standards.^ 
Although these screening mechanisms can be effective, they are also costly.
Diamond (1984) argued that financial intermediaries arise as a conse­
quence of these screening costs. To avoid duplication of effort, and to lower 
their individual costs, investors will form coalitions or designate a single 
agent to perform the screening fijnction for them. A coalition or interme­
diary can achieve economies of scale in information production and pro-
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Table 1
Most Recent Loan Obtained by Finn, 1987-1988
Loan Type Percent Mean in Thousands Median in Thousands
Line of Credit 30 $679 $100
Mortage 14 $335 $120
Motor ^ fehicle 28 $ 33 $ 12
Equipment 15 $ 63 $ 26
Other 11 $282 $ 35
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 1988.
cessing that investors cannot obtain individually (see also Ramakrishnan & 
Thakor, 1984). These coalitions also deliver diversification benefits to 
investors.
This literature, however, does not provide for an explicit relationship 
between the bank’s advantage in information production and the inherent 
nature of the bank itself. The bank’s advantage instead arises largely out of 
its choice to specialize in information production. This assumption impUes 
that any nonbank entity could make the same choice and become compet­
itive with banks in the bank loan market. Furthermore, the early literature 
viewed information production as taking place at loan origination, resum­
ing only in the event of borrower default, suggesting no significant relation­
ship between monitoring and loan returns.
More recent literature on the theory of the banking firm argues that 
financial intermediaries form not just because they can achieve economies 
of scale in information production and processing, as suggested above, but 
because they have a competitive advantage in borrower monitoring that 
arises from their provision of transactions services (Nakamura, 1991, 
1993). Like screening, monitoring involves fixed costs, and investors find 
it economical to delegate monitoring to a central agent. However, banks 
have an advantage over nonbanks in generating information to monitor 
loans because of their exclusive access to the cash flow information con­
tained in transactions accounts kept with the bank. Such cash flow infor­
mation is valuable because changes in cash flow can signal changes in 
borrower quality.
This information base cannot be duplicated by a nonbank competitor 
unless that competitor provides unrestricted transactions accounts to bor­
rowers (i.e., it mimics a bank). Alternatively, borrowers seeking nonbank 
credit could attem pt to communicate the same cash flow information 
tononbank investors, and thereby erode the bank’s exclusive advantage. 
Nonbank investors, however, would have no ability to verify the information
borrowers provide, and banks would have no incentive to confirm or deny 
the information for the benefit of these nonbank investors. To do so would 
erode the banks’ own competitive position. Nakamura also points out that 
this exclusivity is more likely for small or medium-sized firms that operate 
in a limited geographical vicinity; smaller firms are more likely than larger 
firms to channel all of their financial activity through a single bank or 
branch.^
Other studies extend this line of reasoning by arguing that a bank’s 
unique ability to m onitor arises over time as the borrower and lender 
develop an intimate and continuing business relationship. This relation­
ship allows the firm to communicate key aspects of its operation to banks, 
aspects that may be observable by the capital and money markets, but are 
difficult to verify Rajan (1992), for example, refers to an information set 
that includes not only cash flow patterns, but also information on project 
targets, strategic planning, and quality of personnel. Such information 
becomes verifiable by outsiders only ex post, beyond the point where any 
actions could be taken to influence the firm’s decisions.
Carey, Prouse, Rey, and Udell (1993) emphasize the agency and moni­
toring problems in explaining the existence of financial intermediaries in 
what they call the “covenant-monitoring-renegotiation” (CMR) paradigm. 
In this formulation, banks establish specific covenants in their financial 
contracts with borrowers that are intended to control borrower behavior. 
Banks then produce information on an ongoing basis to monitor adherence 
to covenants. Breaches in covenants lead to foreclosures or renegotiations. 
The CMR paradigm underscores the value of relationship and renegotia­
tion in a bank-debt contract relative to a nonbank debt contract.
Lumner and McConnell (1989) test the implications of monitoring- and 
relationship-based theories of financial intermediaries by examining the 
information content in bank loan decisions. They show that although such 
decisions have a positive impact on the stock returns of borrowing firms, 
this impact is only significant for renewals of credit arrangements. New loans— 
loans to applicants halving no history with the lender to which they are 
app ly ing-^o  not produce significant excess returns to the firm’s stock. 
This finding suggests a time-dependency in the bank’s comparative advan­
tage in producing information for monitoring.
Table 2 provides some evidence on the reliance of small firms on banks 
for credit and for other financial services, such as transaction accounts. Fur­
thermore, the clustering of services at banks by small-businesses enhances 
the bank’s access to information unavailable to other financial institutions, 
and allows them to monitor closely users of funds on an ongoing basis. 
Overall, the information and m onitoring advantage of banks enhances
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Table 2
Einancial Services Provided to Small- and 
Medium-Sized Firms by Banks and Nonbanks
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Financial Service
Commercial 
Bank (%) Nonbank (%)
Checking 95 8
Savings 82 27
Credit 81 42
Leasing 31 76
Line of Credit 92 11
Mortgage 79 24
Motor Vehicle Loan 61 46
Equipment Loan 75 31
Other Loan 80 24
Other 94 14
Transactions 96 8
Cash Management 93 7
Credit Related 89 14
Brokerage 12 88
Trust 96 8
Source: Gary Elliehausen and John D. Wolken (1990).
their ability relative to nonbanks to evaluate, price, and control risk of 
information-problematic and monitoring-intensive borrowers.
III. DEBT MARKET MIGRATION
Banks are the primary source of funds for small firms, as the foregoing 
argues, because banks can most efficiendy solve the information and mon­
itoring problems these borrowers present. By extension, the severity of 
information problems and the am ount of direct m onitoring required 
should help determine any firm’s funding options and terms. Size also 
plays a prominent role. Scheme 1 summarizes the relationship between the 
source of funding and the severity of information problems and degree of 
monitoring required. In an arrangement adapted fi-om Carey et al. (1993), 
firms are arrayed across two spectrums: “information problematic” and 
“direct monitoring required.” Moving from left to right, information prob­
lems (regarding the creditworthiness of borrowers) become less and less 
severe. Similarly, the degree of direct monitoring required decreases fix>m
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left to right. In other words, the latitude to use indirect monitoring mech­
anisms increases.®
Size may influence debt market migration independent of information 
and monitoring problems. For example, a single residential mortgage may 
be an excellent credit, but too small for the appetite of the capital markets. 
Similarly, a high-grade small firm with stellar reputation offering an asset- 
based debt instrument may not attract capital market attention simply 
because of size. Size can be an inhibiting factor because of due diligence 
costs. Due diligence costs have a significant fixed component, so investors 
have the incentive to spread these costs over larger investments.
Table 3 shows for manufacturing firms how sources of credit can vary by 
firm size. Of the smallest manufacturing firms, 41 percent draw their fimd- 
ing from banks, compared to 17 percent for the largest manufacturing 
firms. However, the data also reveal that reliance on bank loans neither 
increases nor decreases rnonotonically across size classes, consistent with 
expectations (see Rgure 1). Reliance on bank loans increases from 41 per­
cent to 50 percent as the asset size of the firm rises from less than $5 million 
to between $25 million and $50 million, and then decreases to as low as 17 
percent for the largest firms. Use of total nonbank debt displays a mirror 
image pattern: reliance on nonbank debt decreases from 28 percent for the 
smallest firms to near 20 percent for the next few size classes, and then 
steadily increases until it reaches 65 percent for the firms with more than $1 
billion in assets. The retention rate follows a fairly steady corresponding 
downward path across all of these asset size classes, falling from 80 percent 
for the smallest firms to 29 percent for the largest.
The manufacturing firm data are consistent with life-cycle patterns of 
financing. Small firms initially rely on insider debt (such as borrowings 
from relatives), assets in their private portfolio, accrued expenses, trade 
credit, or retained earnings for ongoing finance (see, e.g., Fazzari, Hub­
bard, & Petersen, 1987; Walker, 1989). Over time, firms may migrate out 
pf costly nonbank debt and into bank loans as they grow larger and develop 
a track record (see Walker, 1989). At the most m ature stage of the 
cycle,where they have developed reputations as credible bank borrowers, 
firms may gain greater access to cheaper, more exclusive sources of capital.
The assumption is that borrowers desire to migrate from the smallest, 
least liquid, and presumably most expensive sources of credit to the larger, 
deeper, and cheaper credit markets as their creditworthiness becomes 
more transparent and as the cost of monitoring the firms declines. This 
assumption of migration between debt markets is consistent with life-cycle 
analyses of small firms (see Walker, 1989) and firms of all sizes (see 
Churchill & Lewis, 1983). Diamond (1991) shows that as firms develop
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Table 3
Select Sources of Rinds for all Manufacturing 
Industries Average from 1986 to 1993
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Size Class
Tbtal Debt Provided
Other 
Banks Institutions
by (%)
Trade 
Accounts 
& Trade 
Notes 
Payable Row Tbtal
Relative
Total*
Retention
Rate**
<$5 million 41 26 33 100 5 80
$5-$ 10 million 48 20 31 100 2 76
$10-$25 million 50 21 30 100 3 72
$25-$50 million 50 23 27 100 3 78
$50-$ 100 milUon 47 28 25 100 3 78
$100-$250miUion 44 34 22 100 5 60
$250M-$1B 36 45 19 100 13 49
>$1B 17 64 19 100 13 49
All size classes 25 53 21 100 100 68
Notes: * Relative total is total funds to a size class, excluding retained earnings, as a percent of total 
funds to all firms.
♦♦Retention rate is net after-tax income not distributed as dividends as a percent of total 
after-tax-income.
Source: Quarterly Financial Reports of the Census (1986-1993).
reputation their access to the direct finance market increases. This pattern 
suggests th a t there  are p recond itions to debt m arket m igration . 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) formaUze the decision for the borrower 
as a choice between directly signaling its quality to investors and indirectly 
signaling quality by contracting debt through a financial intermediary. 
Here, the borrower will choose the signalling process that involves lower 
costs. Signalling costs can vary by numerous factors including borrower 
size, industry, age, and collateral.
Other types of costs may also prompt firms to choose direct finance over 
bank-intermediated debt when possible. Rajan (1992) argues that bank- 
intermediated debt becomes onerous and wealth-extracting because of the 
access and control over the firm that the bank’s relationship with the bor­
rower provides. As a consequence, borrowers will migrate to other sources 
of finance whenever possible. However, Carey et al. (1993) qualify this line 
of argument by pointing out that the greater ability to renegotiate bank 
debt has value that compensates for some of its higher direct and indirect 
costs. For this reason, firms with access to the direct finance market might 
instead choose a large, syndicated bank loan.
IV SECURITIZATION
Securitization is the process of bundling existing loans into pools and issu­
ing new financial claims against those pools. These new financial claims can 
have denomination, maturity, and risk characteristics that are either identi­
cal to or different firom those of the underlying loans, depending upon the 
purposes of the securitization and the perceived preferences of investors. 
During the past two decades, securitization has been successfiilly utilized in 
certain sectors and has revolutionized some areas of financial intermedia­
tion, beginning with mortgages in the 1970s, and spreading to other assets 
such as automobile loans and credit card receivables in recent years. The 
ability of securitization to transform seemingly illiquid assets into easily 
marketable securities has lead to substantial benefits for the borrower, 
lender, and investor.
Securitization can be viewed as a vehicle allowing once bank-dependent 
borrowers to migrate to the public debt markets. Based on the above dis­
cussion, and as depicted in Figure 1, select borrowers can accomplish such 
migration only when important information, monitoring, and size criteria 
are met. Pooling solves the size problem. Technological advances have 
eased the information problems, allowing for the accumulation and analy­
sis of enormous amounts of loan performance information. It is now rela­
tively affordable for third-party investors to evaluate through due diligence 
the expected performance of the credits that underlie a securitization. 
Such efficiency gains have diminished one of the key motives for forming 
“financial coalitions” in the first place: the reduction of transactions costs 
to individual investors.
Achieving transactions cost reductions relies on more than just technol­
ogy, however. The ability to utilize sampling techniques on the target port­
folio is also a critical factor in lowering due diligence costs. In a sufficiendy 
large pool of small credits, investors can randomly sample the loans, rather 
than evaluate all of them, without compromising the credit analysis. Due 
diligence costs would be prohibitive otherwise. This reliance on sampling 
assumes some degree of homogeneity in the underlying credits, not only in 
terms of the underwriting standards that they satisfy, 1but also in perfor­
mance characteristics. Transactions costs for the investor are also reduced 
to some extent by professional rating agencies, which provide verification 
of the observed quality of the underlying credits. Rating agencies also help 
size the credit enhancements or “loss protection” that the underlying cred­
its will require before the associated securities will command the attention 
of investors.
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Retention Rate
Total Debt Provided by Banks 
Total Debt Provided by Nonbanks
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986-1993).
Rgurel 
Quarterly Financial Data
Because of the nature of the credits that have been securitized in vol­
ume to date, direct post-credit monitoring has not been a problem needing 
resolution. Nearly all of the credits that have been securitized in volume 
have been asset-backed, except for credit card receivables and accounts 
receivable. Credit card receivables, however, generate an excess spread to 
protect investors from losses. Securitized accounts receivable deals have 
involved large, v\rell-known corporations, short-term maturities, and sub­
stantial overcollateralization (loss protection).
It is important to emphasize that although securitization can provide a 
vehicle to move intermediated loans into the capital markets, it cannot by 
itself resolve underlying information and monitoring problems. Individual 
loans that are information- and monitoring-problematic before the securi­
tization will be no less so after the securitization. Securitization is an infor- 
m ation-consum ing technology, not an inform ation-generating one. 
Consequently, securitization delivers the most benefits when the credits in 
the pool have few information or monitoring problems or, if substantial 
problems are present, when inexpensive loss protection is available.
For loan types with few such problems, the potential benefits of securi­
tization are numerous, including increased asset liquidity, improved alloca­
tion of risk, a higher level of investment in the affected sector, and, for 
banks, a reduction in regulatory capital and reserve requirements. Further­
more, by allowing for a separation of loan origination, loan funding, and 
loan servicing, securitization allows market participants to play to their 
strengths. The net eflFect of these benefits is lower prices or an increase in 
the general level of investment in the affected sector or both. Arguments for 
how and why these potential benefits emerge are numerous and compel­
ling; the principal ones are outlined in the next section. Subsequent sec­
tions analyze why such benefits are unlikely when inform ation and 
monitoring problems have not been resolved.
A. The Benefits of Securitization
Securitization could raise overall investment by channeling funds 
between informationally segmented banking markets. Segmentation 
results because banks in one region have better information about the local 
economy and potential borrowers than do banks firom other regions. Banks 
in one community may not be willing, therefore, to make loans to borrowers 
in another, simply because they are unable to properly evaluate the credit­
worthiness of those borrowers. Profitable projects in one region may go 
unfunded, while marginally profitable projects in other regions receive 
funds.
The underlying premise here is that opportunity-rich banks face a fund­
ing or deposit constraint but view an expansion of the deposit base as a 
costly option. The crucial implication of this premise is that banks are will­
ing to accept the risk of additional loans—would make and hold more loans- 
if they had funding available. Securitization provides a means of resolving 
the liquidity constraint by tying the constrained banks to capital/deposit 
resources in another community. Through the vehicle of securitization, 
capital-surplus or deposit-surplus banks in regions with limited lending 
opportunities could purchase loans made by capital-constrained or 
deposit-constrained banks in regions with abundant lending opportunities 
(see Boyd & Smith, 1989; or Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1994). By linking pre­
viously segmented markets, securitization would provide borrowers with 
funding opportunities that did not previously exist.
Lower prices and/or higher quantities of credit may result for the 
affected borrowers—such as buyers of homes or small business owners—as 
securitization allows banks to tap a broader funding base than is available 
through the more restricted demand deposit market. Securitization can
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lower funding rates in many ways. Investors outside the bank’s local 
deposit market may have a greater tolerance for interest rate and credit 
risk, and these investors may have maturity preferences that directly match 
those of the assets being funded. Further benefits can arise from the oppor­
tunities for portfolio risk management achieved by expanding the number 
of loans in the pool to achieve both geographic and industry diversification.
The transformation of denominations and maturities made possible 
through securitizations can also fiirther improve risk-sharing beyond that 
achieved by tapping into a broader funding base. Securitizations typically 
involve multi-tranche or multi-class securities, which allow investors to hold 
claims against specific bank assets, with credit risk varying across each 
tranche.'^ The most risk-averse investors would purchase the senior claims, 
whereas those with less risk-aversion can select the subordinated claims. 
Borrowing rates would be reduced to the extent that the multiple instru­
ments more closely match investor preferences. This is consistent with Ben- 
eveniste and Berger (1987), who argue that securitization may lower 
fimding costs by creating prioritized or sequential loss claims.
Securitization might also deliver lower overall funding costs to banks by 
allowing them to reduce or avoid regulatory taxes, such as reserve and cap­
ital requirements, a point made by Pennachi (1988). The reduction in reg­
ulatory taxes results from the decreased reliance on deposits and the 
reduction in asset holdings, or in some cases a shift to asset holdings that 
require less capital. Increased marketability of these loans also may lower 
the liquidity premium that banks would require to hold these assets. In a 
competitive market, these lower funding costs will translate into lower 
interest rates for borrowers, thus prompting more bank lending.
James (1988) a r^ e s  that securitization may raise overall investment by 
resolving a conflict that can arise between a bank’s shareholders and debt­
holders. Bank management may forego profitable investment opportuni­
ties that would reduce the bank’s overall risk in order to avoid a wealth 
transfer from shareholders to debtholders. This transfer takes place 
because yields on debt payments are fixed and reflect the riskiness of the 
portfolio that exists at the time the debt is issued. Even though subsequent 
projects may lower the portfolio’s risk, debt payments remain fixed. Thus, 
existing debtholders would be compensated to carry more risk than they 
actually bear Shareholder resistance to this wealth transfer islikely to result 
in underinvestment in risk-reducing, profitable projects. Securitized debt 
resolves this conflict by effectively issuing new debt for each pool of new 
projects. Returns to new debtholders therefore will always reflect the actual 
risk of the new projects being undertaken. All else equal, this would raise 
the level of investment in the affected loan markets.
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B. “Disintermediation Securitization” vs. 
“Balance-Sheet Securitization”
The net benefits of interhnked markets—^improved risk-sharing, reduc­
tion in regulatory taxes, resolution of shareholder/debtholder conflicts— i^s 
a lower borrowing rate or a higher quantity of credit or both. These bene­
fits will not, however, automatically materialize wherever securitization is 
applied. Basically, the benefits of securitization to the selling bank (and the 
affected borrower) rise as the amount of loss protection provided by the 
selling bank falls.^ Conversely, the benefits of the loan sale fall as the 
amount of loss protection provided by the selling bank rises.^ In fact, the 
capital benefits of the loan sale approach zero as the percentage loss pro­
tection provided by the seller approaches the percentage capital charge on 
the loan.^^
That loss protection, or credit enhancement as it is also called, can take 
any number of forms: a subordinate piece on a structured deal, a letter of 
credit guaranteeing first losses up to a certain percentage of principal 
value, or a recourse obligation. Regardless of the form, the economic effect 
of providing loss protection is that the seller retains some, or in many cases, 
all of the credit risk on the underlying loans. This provision of loss protec­
tion mitigates the benefits of securitization to the seller.
Consider the mechanics. If a bank can sell off all of a single mortgage 
loan, then it has shed the entire risk of the loan and now can use the pro­
ceeds of the sale to make additional loans. By entering into a cycle of orig­
ination and sale, the bank can raise the number of mortgage loans it makes 
in a given year while generating fee income, yet it neither alters its risk pro­
file nor incurs capital costs because it does not book any assets. Further­
more, because the loan sale process frees originators from having to hold 
these assets on book, new nonbank originators have more incentive to enter 
the market. The net effect is therefore twofold: each originator can make 
more loans than before and the number of participating originators rises.
Following Berger and Udell (1992), we call this type of securitization 
“disintermediation securitization. ” Disintermediation securitization is defined 
as securitization involving the sale of bank loans where the seller retains no 
stake in the loans and no longer acts as principal monitor of the loan to 
ensure its repayment. Banks might continue to play a role as broker 
between borrower and lender, but they are no longer the only agent that 
can match borrowers and investors, and they no longer necessarily provide 
the funding or the monitoring for the loans. Loan sales under these conditions 
would genuinely reflect a shift away from bank-frmded debt to direct financing by the 
capital markets. Borrowers are naturally migrating fi-om a debt market that
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requires some degree of lender monitoring to another debt market, where 
the lender does not need to retain a stake in the credit and where the 
lender’s role in monitoring is reduced or eliminated. This natural migra­
tion to the next credit market delivers lower funding costs and a higher 
qucintity of credit to the affected borrowers. Developments in the mortgage 
and auto loan markets exemplify this type of migration. In both of those 
cases, a bank is no longer needed in the underwriting, servicing or moni­
toring of the loans.
In contrast, if a bank can only sell off a senior portion of the loan, 
retaining, for example, the first 20 percent as loss protection, then the bank 
has less to use for additional loans and the bank retains the preponderance 
of the credit risk of that loan.^^ The bank certainly has proceeds available 
to make additional loans, but each new loan alters the bank’s risk profile. 
Furthermore, under current and proposed capital rules for loan sales where 
the seller retains some obligation to cover losses, the bank’s regulatory cap­
ital charces can easily be equal to the capital it held against the loan before 
the sale.^ Unless the bank finds the marginal cost of deposit generation 
too great, such that securitized funding comes cheaper, securitization buys 
the bank little benefit. Similarly, the incentive for non-bank originators to 
enter the market is also dampened to the extent that they cannot act as sim­
ple fee generating brokers, but might actually have to maintain a lending 
book.
We label these transactions “balance-sheet securitizations” defining them 
as securitizations where the originator retains a stake in the loans sold. As 
described, the originator can maintain this stake either on-balance sheet, 
perhaps by holding a subordinated position, or off-balance sheet, through 
the provision of recourse or a letter of credit. Regardless of the form of 
this stake, the seller is obligated to cover losses up to a certain percentage 
of the asset’s value. In this respect, the seller’s stake in the loan plays a role 
much like that of regulatory capital, which is first in line to absorb losses 
against a bank’s portfoUo. Balance-sheet securitizations, even poolings of 
nonperforming real estate, routinely take place.
C. Factors Influencing the Amount of 
Seller-Provided Loss Protection
Two critical factors affect the amount of loss protection a bank will have 
to provide on loans it sells: 1) the risks and returns of the underlying assets; 
and 2) the amount of direct monitoring the loans will require and the costs 
involved in arranging for that monitoring. Obviously, the higher the risk on 
the underlying assets, the more loss protection the purchaser will require.
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An example of the relationship between credit quality and loss protection is 
apparent in the am ount of credit loss protection that rating agencies 
require of loan portfolios that desire a certain rating. Table 4 shows the 
amount of structural credit protection required to obtain each of the listed 
ratings. The column on the right provides an example of how much loss 
the underlying collateral with the corresponding rating must be able to 
withstand without interrupting payments. The lower the credit quality, the 
higher loss protection is provided. Note also that the lower the initial qual­
ity of the underlying loans, the more marginal loss protection the deal 
requires to reach the top rating.
Of course, investors need basic information about a host of borrower 
and business attributes to estimate risks and returns. The absence of such 
information regarding the creditworthiness of the underlying borrowers 
complicates risk assessment, thereby leading investors to require even more 
loss protection. Information problems also make it difficult for purchasers 
to detect whether losses they experience on the loans they purchase are due 
to bad luck, bad underwriting, or moral hazard. This difficulty creates an 
incentive for the seller to sell bad loans or to make loans that they otherwise 
would not make.^^ However, the purchaser minimizes adverse incentives to 
the seller by raising the seller’s stake in the loans sold. Since the adverse 
actions will now affect the seller first and foremost, the seller has incentive 
to adhere to prudent underwriting practices. In short, loss protection will 
rise as risk rises and as information problems about risks and returns 
worsen.
The relationship between monitoring problems and the amount of a 
loan the bank can sell off is also straightforward. Banks that sell loans lose 
their incentive to monitor (see Beider & Udell, 1992; Boyd & Smith, 1989; 
Greenbaum & Thakor, 1987; Mester, 1992). Failing to m onitor can 
adversely affect the distribution of loan returns, as described above. The 
more severe the agency problem, the greater the adverse impact that failing 
to monitor will have on the return distribution. Investors can be expected 
to recognize the relationship between monitoring and returns for such loan 
types, and to seek a contract that restores the bank’s incentive to monitor. 
By purchasing less of the loan, the buyer leaves the bulk of the benefits from 
monitoring to the selling agent, restoring the seller’s incentive to properly 
monitor the borrowers.
Preliminary research by Beshouri and Nigro (1994) on loan sales con­
tracts provides some evidence for the relationship between monitoring and 
loss protection. Beshouri and Nigro analyze large credits sold off by U.S. 
commercial banks in an effort to isolate the factors affecting the level of loss 
protection provided by a selling bank. Among other things, their analysis
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m ie  4:
Loss Protection Associated with a 
Given Credit Rating on Senior Bank Loans
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Desired Rating
Loss Protection Provided 
(percent)
Aaa 51
Aal 41
Aa2 39
Aa3 37
A1 35
A2 34
A3 32
Baal 31
Baa2 29
Baa3 26
Source: Linda Moses (1992).
shows that the lead or originating bank on these large credits retains a 
greater share of the loans that require more extensive post-funding moni­
toring. Specifically, for those loans where monitoring requirements are 
high, the average amount the selling bank must retain on those loans is 
higher than the average amount required for all loans.
Overall, loss protection will rise as risk worsens, and as problems of 
information and monitoring worsen. However, the higher the level of loss 
protection provided by the selling bank, the higher its credit risk exposure, 
the less it has in the way of funds to recycle, and the fewer regulatory capital 
benefits the loan sale can generate. Capital costs are perhaps the most sig­
nificant issue for most banks contemplating loan sales. However, once the 
percentage loss protection provided by the bank exceeds the percentage 
capital requirement for the loans securitized, the bank no longer generates 
capital cost savings. Regulatory policy currently requires banks to hold cap­
ital against all of the assets supported by a recourse obligation.
V SMALL BUSINESS LOAN SEDURITIZATIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS AND SOME EVIDENCE
Based upon the foregoing a ilm e n ts , securitizations of loans that are infor­
mation- and monitoring-problematic should carry substantial amounts of 
loss protection. This should be the case for securitizations of small business 
loans, because little public information exists about small business borrow-
ers and they require substantial amounts of post-funding monitoring. The 
structure of the few small business loan securitizations that have been done 
to date is consistent with these predictions.
Table 5 shows important characteristics of three securitizations of non­
guaranteed, small business loan securitizations.^® Most importantly, all 
three deals required substantial loss protection. The Chrysler Financial 
Corporation securitization carried a 35 percent subordination, while the 
Fremont General Corporation deal of 1993, the first transaction under SEC 
Rule 3(a)-7, carried 19 percent subordination.^^ The Money Store deal, 
which securitized the unguaranteed portions of SBA loans, carried nine 
percent subordination, and a four percent spread account. The level of 
loss protection is well in excess of the capital charge for all these transac­
tions.
Several other features of these securitizations are also worth noting.
1. All the loans in each individual deal are from the same originator 
or group of affiliated originators, so there is naturally some “unifor­
mity” in the loan underwriting standards. This would not automat­
ically be the case for pools of loans originated by a multitude of 
unaffiliated lenders.
2. These transactions are all asset-backed; real estate was used in two 
cases.
3. The average loan size in each case is fairly laige, making the under­
lying credits more middle-market than small business loans. The 
average loan size varies from about $200,000 in the Chrysler deal 
to over $1.5 million in the Fremont deal.
More recently, Norwest, a bank holding company headquartered in 
Minneapolis, has been making an effort to securitize small business loans. 
Norwest has approached smaller banks in the region with strong credit 
track records to participate in a securitization program. These smaller orig­
inating banks screen potential borrowers using a weighted average of four 
separate credit worthiness tests: cash flow, leverage, profitability, and work­
ing capital. To ensure homogeneity of loans, Norwest only considers loans 
to manufacturers for the program. Loans that pass the four-part screen are 
referred by the originating bank to Norwest, where they have a 75 percent 
chance of being pooled and securitized. Both of these requirements—lim­
iting the credits to a fairly homogenous pool and satisfying strict underwrit­
ing perform ance criteria—greatly reduce any inform ation problems 
associated with these loans. Most importantly, and consistent with our pre­
dictions, Norwest requires each participating banks to maintain a 65 per-
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cent ownership position in the loans it sells. This mitigates any remaining 
information and risk problems, and eases any concerns the pooler and the 
ultimate investors may have about the loans being properly monitored. 
Thus far, Norwest has not yet been able to gather sufficient credits to get 
the program off the ground.
In contrast to the thin secondary market for unguaranteed small busi­
ness loans, there exists a flourishing secondary market for the guaranteed 
portions of SBA 7(a) loans. About 37,000 SBA loans, with value of about 
$7.9 billion, have traded hands since the secondary market began operat­
ing. This market provides liquidity to the guaranteed portions of SBA 
loans, and helps originators better match maturities of assets and liabilities. 
This market also enhances SBA’s ability to provide small businesses with 
access to long-term debt.
SBA-backed small business loans are, however, quite different from the 
types of small business credits analyzed in this study. The SBA loans in 
these pools are, by definition, registered instruments backed by the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. government. Furthermore, the pools only include the 
guaranteed portions of those SBA loans. This guarantee effectively 
amounts to 100 percent loss protection, thus obviating any investor con­
cerns over risk, information, or monitoring. Clearly, the success of the sec­
ondary market for the guaranteed portions of SBA loans flows from the 
presence of the U.S. government guarantee, a guarantee not present for 
ordinary loans.
The actual and proposed securitization programs of non-guaranteed 
small business loans described above are all examples of what we call “bal­
ance sheet securitizations,” meaning that the selling banks are not able to 
entirely shed the loan (and the risk) from their balance sheets. The crucial 
distinction between small business loan securitizations that have taken 
place and disintermediation securitization is that with respect to the former, 
concerns about potential adverse actions on the part of the selling bank, the 
riskiness of the underlying borrowers, and the impact of monitoring on a 
loan’s returns have not been resolved. Rather, these concerns have been cir­
cumvented through the provision of ample loss protection by the selling 
agent.
Over time, subordination specifically, and loss protection generally, may 
decline as the market becomes increasingly familiar with these transactions. 
However, this loss protection must not only fall as low as the capital require­
ment that banks normally must meet on such loans, it must surpass that 
point to generate capital cost savings for banks. Furthermore, if nonbank 
originators in the mortgage credit market are any guide, nonbank origina­
tors are likely to enter the small business lending market in large numbers
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Table 5. Small Business Loan Securitizations
Issuer Chrysler Financial Fremont Financial The Money Store
Credit
Type
Nationwide 
real-estate secured
Nationwide revolving 
asset-backed loans
Nationwide adjustable 
SBA 7(a) loans secured by 
owner occupied commer­
cial real estate
Amount $350 million $200 million $76 million
Structure REMIC Trust Revolving Master 
Trust
Revolving Master Trust
Rating AAA AAA Class A: AAA 
Class B : A
Loss
Protectio n
35 percent 
subordination
19 percent 
subordination
9 percent subordination 
4 percent spread account
Pricing LIBOR + 120bp LIBOR + 47bp Class A: Prime -95.0 bp 
Class B: Prime -12.5 bp
Expected
Term
2 years 3 years 7.6 years
Investor
Profile
Bank portfolios, 
Europe and mutual 
funds
Mutual funds and 
bank portfolio
Mutual funds and other 
institutional investors
Loan size No mortgage loan 
having a principal 
greater than 
$2,000,000 
Average: $209,730
Loan from $500,000 
to $5,000,000 
Average: $1,500,000
Original loan less than 
$50,000 to $2,000,000 
Average: $398,000
when their need to maintain a portfolio of these credits is minimal. Retain­
ing portions of the loans they originate pushes these market participants 
into the role of portfolio manager.
Securitization of small business loans therefore can take place, and 
we have seen a scattered few, but such securitizations do not allow small 
business loans to migrate fully off the bank’s balance sheet. Because of 
these factors, securitization will not allow banks to shed risk, generate 
fees, or lower capital costs to the extent seen in the securitizations of 
other types of loans. Consequently, in the absence of government guar­
antees (implicit or explicit), or other programs that reduce the risks 
faced by loan purchasers or loan sellers, securitization cannot be 
expected to have the same impact on credit flows to small business bor­
rowers that it has had for borrowers in the m ortgage, auto loan, or 
credit card markets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The securitization of business loans is not a sufficient condition to increase 
the amount of credit available to small businesses. This does not mean that 
securitization lacks value in the area of small business lending, only that the 
value lies elsewhere. Securitization might furnish investors with a bank- 
directed channel for funding small business loans, facilitate some diversifi­
cation, and increase the liquidity of select portions of a bank’s small business 
loan portfolio. However, our analysis suggests that the level of loss protec­
tion increases as information problems and the need for direct monitoring 
required by the lender rise and that as the amount of loss protection rises, 
the benefits fipom securitization are greatly reduced. Two of the most prom­
inent characteristics of small business borrowers are the lack of information 
available about small business risks and returns, and the substantial amount 
of post-funding monitoring they require. Consequently, any such securiti­
zations are likely to carry substantial loss protection, which, among its other 
effects, will reduce or eliminate any capital cost reductions expected from 
thesecuritization. Consequently, such securitizations are likely to have little 
impact on a bank’s willingness to make more of the same loans. Regardless 
of the future success of schemes to securitize the high end of small business 
loan market, banks are likely to retain an important role in small business 
finance due to their special advantages in monitoring these credits.
If securitization is unlikely to raise the equilibrium level of small busi­
ness lending, the obvious question is: what will? Members of Congress have 
proposed a number of bills they believe will accomplish this goal. Some of 
their bills envision an explicit guarantee through an expansion of SBA 
lending or creation of a government-sponsored enterprise (e.g., \felda-Sue). 
Others would create an implicit guarantee through the deposit insurance 
fund by lowering the capital requirements against recourse obligations. 
Some of these programs seek to promote a secondary market for small busi­
ness loans, while others go directly to the issues of the risk and losses asso­
ciated with small-business lending, treating the development of a secondary 
market as a separate issue. Further analysis would be necessary to deter­
mine the merits of these various approaches.
If a securitization program were preceded by or developed simulta­
neously with some type of loan guarantee or credit enhancement program, 
then the amount of credit available to smaller firms would easily increase. 
However, the increase in small business lending would follow largely from 
the guarantee, not the presence of a secondary market. While the implicit 
or explicit guarantees in government-sponsored programs might improve 
the flow of credit to small businesses, the benefits must be weighed along
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with the costs. In particular, federal or state guarantees or credit enhance­
ment programs to promote a secondary market would expose government 
to significant contingent liabilities and could subject commercial banks to 
subsidized competition.
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NOTES
1. Numerous proxies have been used to define a business as small, including the number 
of employees, the level of annual sales or assets, the oi^anizational structure, and the 
level of market concentration in an industry. For the purposes of this paper, we are 
concerned with firms that are involuntarily confined to a local financial market in 
accessing credit and face all of the problems that such segmentation implies. In 
particular, market segmentation can lead to differences in rates across borrowers with 
similar risk characteristics, but residing in different locales. By moving away fix>m a 
definition that focuses strictly on specific size characteristics and moving toward one 
that groups firms according to common elements in their financing outcomes, we avoid 
excluding firms that might face financing constraints but which would not be 
considered small on an asset-based or employee-based standard.
2. See Davies (1993).
3. See Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) for a description of the data.
4. The price mechanism does not provide a perfect screening device, because raising 
interest rates to compensate for concerns over risk may actually drive out safe 
borrowers, and lower the average credit quality of the borrower pool. For a discussion 
of credit rationing, see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
5. If banks are allowed to branch across state lines, larger firms would have a genuine 
option to use a single banking firm for all of their transactions services. Nakamura’s 
argument would then have some, but not complete, applicabihty for these latter firms 
as well. The difference is that larger firms may be more transparent to third parties 
even if a single bank handles all of that firm’s banking business.
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6. The critical difference from Carey et al. (1993) is that information availability is broken 
down here to its component parts: information for origination and information for 
monitoring. We also subsume the firm size into the information spectrum.
7. Whereas loan sales typically distribute losses proportional to the participation of the 
loan purchaser, securitization allows a bank to prioritize or sequence claims against a 
pool of loans, such that one party provides loss protection to all subsequent investors 
in the loan pool. Each sequence represents a separate tranche, or loss position, just as 
senior debt is one tranche and mezzanine debt another.
8. It is immaterial whether this loss protection is purchased or provided in the way of a 
retained portion of the loan.
9. Portions retained in securitizations typically differ from portions retained in 
participations. In the latter case, all participants share losses and proceeds 
proportional to their percentage participation. So a 10 percent participation in a loan 
exposes the participant to 10 percent of the losses and obligates the participating bank 
to put up 10 percent of the overall capital required. In the event of a 10 percent loss 
on the underlying assets, the holder of a 10 percent participation would absorb a one 
percent loss. Securitizations are more akin to structured financings, where loss 
positions are sequential not proportional, and where capital requirements can be more 
substantial. For example, a 10 percent subordinate position in a securitization would 
expose the participant to all losses against the total assets securitized up to the flill 
value of that position. So a 10 percent loss on the underlying assets would wipe out this 
subordinated position and leave all holders of senior positions intact.
10. Capital benefits are zero when the seller provides first-loss protection equal to or 
greater than the capital charge on the loans sold. For example, capital benefits are zero 
if a banks holds a four percent first-loss position on mortgage loans sold into a pool. 
This is because current capital rules require that the selling bank hold capital not only 
against the first-loss position, but against all more senior positions as well. These rules 
reflect the fact that a subordinate position in a securitization exposes the holder to all 
losses against the total assets securitized, up to the full value of that subordinate piece.
11. Because the bank holds the first 20 percent of the loan, it faces all losses on the 
underlying loan up to 20 percent which, except for exceedingly risky loans, covers the 
preponderance of the credit risk.
12. For a description of current and proposed recourse capital rules, see Federal Register 
1994. The Riegle Banking Act of 1994 has special provisions that could ease capital 
requirements for well-capitalized banks.
13. Loss protection can also be capitalized into purchase price through the use of 
discounts. The disadvantage of this loss protection for sellers is that they must 
recognize expected future losses (or some multiple of expected future losses) upon sale, 
and would not benefit if losses turned out to be less than expected.
14. The importance of strict FNMA and GNMA guidelines becomes more apparent in 
light of the incentives that sellers of loans can face. Strict guidelines by these agencies 
help police seller behavior, and violation of these guidelines can lead to loss of 
accreditation as a FNMA or GNMA participant. A similar argument is made in 
Constand et al (1991) for resolving agency problems in asset-based lending contracts.
15. Beshouri and Nigro (1994) mimeo.
16. In these deals the loans were converted in to securitites by creating a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) in the form of a trust, to which the whole loans were sold. The trust then 
issued securities financed from the cash flow generated by tyhe pool of loans. By 
establishing a trust structure, multiple securitizations can be done, while maintaining
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maximum flexibility in the structure and terems of the series issued. An often-cited 
reason for the feasibility and successful placement of these securities backed by loans 
has been the SEC passage of Rule 3a-7. This rule exempted securitizations of loans 
from the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
17. The Fremont deal is also unique because the loans securitized constituted a large 
percentage of the lender’s portfolio. This eliminates investors’ potential concerns that 
the pool may not be representative of the lender’s entire small business loan portfolio. 
Such concerns are prominent when only select portions of a portfolio are securitized.
18. This deal was highly unusual, and it is unlikely that the SBA would permit a less well- 
known originator to complete a similar deal.
19. Note that even in these deals, however, the SBA requires the originator to retain the 
unguaranteed portion of the loans it sells. This ensures that the originator continues 
to have an incentive to monitor the loans properly. While monitoring may not matter 
to the investor, it does matter to the SBA, because it is the guarantor of last resort.
20. One provision within the recent Community Development Financial Institution 
legislation sets up a loss sharing program along the lines of state-based programs, such 
as the Michigan Strategic Fund.
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